The Application Level Multicast (ALM) simplifies the implementation of group communication. However, it still suffer from the same management overhead in case of highly dynamic sessions. In this paper, we propose an efficient key management protocol, called Transition Key Scheme (TKS), for ALM communication. TKS aims to reduce the key management overhead in case of highly dynamic membership sessions by using a unique Traffic Encryption Key (TEK), for the group, and a small number of individual transition keys to temporally manage members who recently joined the group. Simulation results confirm that TKS reduces significantly key management overhead, compared to other existing ALM key management protocols. In addition, we validated our scheme using AVISPA validation tool, and the results show that TKS is safe against intruder attacks.
Introduction
Application Level Multicast (ALM) aims to simplify group communication by implementing the multicast functionality at the application layer instead of the networking layer. Using ALM, an end-host can join a multicast group without the need of native multicast support at the network routers. An ALM protocol constructs and maintains an overlay tree between the end host members of the multicast group, and the multicast traffic is transmitted from one member to another through this overlay tree using unicast connections.
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This gives the following advantages for ALM solutions compared to the classical IP multicast. First, application layer multicast is easy to deploy. It does not require changes at the network layer and it does not require universal network support to be deployed. Second, the construction of a logical overlay tree hides routing complications such as link failure instances. Third, intermediate nodes do not have to maintain per group state for each multicast group. Fourth, in the ALM architecture, all multicast related tasks such as group membership management, packet replication and forwarding and state maintenance are handled by the end hosts. Intermediate routers play no role in an ALM protocol. Finally, application layer multicast can exploit the capabilities of lower layer protocols to provide reliability, congestion control, flow control or security according to the needs of the application.
Despite all these advantages, ALM do not simplify security issues for group communications compared to the traditional IP Multicast and an important research effort should be dedicated to this issue in order to propose robust and viable ALM solutions.
In order to secure group communications, security mechanisms such as authentication, access control, integrity verification and confidentiality are required. Most of these mechanisms rely generally on encryption using one or several Traffic Encryption Keys (TEKs). The management of these keys, which includes creating, distributing and updating the keys, constitutes then a basic block to build secure group communication applications. Group communication confidentiality requires that only valid users could decrypt the multicast data sent on the overlay tree. This can be translated into four key distribution requirements:
• Non-group confidentiality: Users that were never part of the group should not have access to any key that can decrypt any multicast data sent to the group.
• Forward confidentiality: Users which left the group should not have access to any future key. This ensures that a member cannot decrypt data after it leaves the group.
• Backward confidentiality: A new user that joins the session should not have access to any old key. This ensures that a member cannot decrypt data sent before it joins the group.
• Collusion freedom: Any set of fraudulent users should not be able to deduce the current used key.
In order to meet the above requirements, a rekey process should be triggered after each join/leave to/from the secure group. It consists in generating a new TEK (or a set of TEKs) and distributing it to the members including the new one in case of a join or to the residual members in case of a leave. This process ensures that a new member can not decrypt eventually stored multicast data (before its joining) and prevents a leaving member from eavesdropping future multicast data. A critical problem with any rekey technique is scalability: as the rekey process should be triggered after each membership change, the number of TEK update messages may be important in case of frequent join and leave operations, and induces what is commonly called: 1 affects n phenomenon. i.e., a single membership change in the group affects all the other group members. Some solutions propose to organise the secure group into clusters with different local traffic encryption keys, others propose to use a different TEK between each neighbours hosts in the tree. This reduces the overhead of the key updating process (1 affects n), but increases decryption and re-encryption overhead along each data path in the tree.
In this paper, we propose a new key management scheme, called Transition Key Scheme (TKS), to be used in ALM protocols. TKS reduces the key management overhead by using a unique TEK for all group members and a set of individual transition keys for members who recently joined the group. The TEK is periodically updated in order to integrate members who are in the transition state (managed by individual transition keys). The use of a small set of transition keys decreases the key updating overhead (1 affects n), and the use of a unique TEK for the group avoids important decryption and re-encryption overhead.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we present related work on ALM protocols, security issues in ALM and we present the solutions proposed for securing ALM group. In Section 3, we detail our new key management scheme. Key management and data encryption/decryption overhead analysis of our TKS scheme are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we present the validation results of TKS using the AVISPA validation tool. In Section 6, we give some simulation results of performances of our scheme compared to three other schemes. The paper is concluded in Section 7.
Related work

ALM protocols
As shown in Figure 1 , we can classify ALM proposals into centralised and distributed algorithms. In the Centralised algorithm, a session controller node (a rendez-vous point) collects information about the distance between all the group members and then calculates the overlay tree and informs each member about its place in this overlay. The controller node may have a full knowledge of the underline network such as in HBM (Roca and El-sayed, 2001 ) and ESM (El-sayed, 2006) , or just a partial knowledge such as in ALMI (Pendarakis et al., 2001) . In the Distributed algorithm, the overlay is constructed in an incremental manner. Each member, independently, calculates its own place in the overlay tree. There are two approaches for distributed overlay construction: the 'mesh first' approach and the 'tree first' approach. In the mesh first approach, a mesh is first calculated between all the group members and then the overlay tree is built on the top of this mesh. This can be done based on peer-to-peer infrastructure information such as in Bayeux (Zhuang et al., 2001) , Chord (Stoica et al., 2001) , Scribe (Rowstron and Kermarrec, 2002) and Borg (Zhang and Hu, 2003) , or using an RPF routing algorithm similar to DVMRP (Waitzman et al., 1988) such as in NARADA (Chu et al., 2000) , Scattercast (Chawathe, 2000) and MeshTree (Tan et al., 2005) or finally using arbitrary nodes coordinate in various virtual geometrical spaces such as in CAN (Ratnasamy et al., 2001) , Hypercast (Liebeherr and Beam, 1999) and Delaunay trangulation (Liebeherr et al., 2001) .
In the tree first approach, a tree topology is constructed by adding independently each member to the existing overlay. The tree construction can be realised using a greedy Prim-like algorithm such as in HMTP (Zhang et al., 2002) , Yoid (Francis, 2002) , TAG (Kwon and Fahmy, 2005) , Overcast (Jannotti et al., 2000) , SwitchTree (Helder and Jamin, 2002) , BTP (Helder and Jamin, 2000) , HostCast (Li and Mohapatra, 2003) , OMNI (Banerjee et al., 2003) , TOMA (Lao et al., 2005) and AOM (Wu and Banerjee, 2004) or using a greedy Kruskal-like algorithm such as in TBCP (Mathy et al., 2001 ). The overlay tree may also be built using a hierarchical clusters construction such as in Nice (Banerjee and Bhattacharjee, 2002) , ZIGZAG (Tran et al., 2003) , ZHCP (Mathy et al., 2002) , Kudos (Jain et al., 2002) and LCC (Kaafar et al., 2006) .
Security issues in ALM
One of the most studied issues in ALM security is the problem of cheating behaviour in ALM sessions. Authors in Shetty et al. (2006) studied how to detect the presence of malicious activities in the overlay tree based on their history performance. Each member monitors the performances of its neighbour(s) and reports them to the RP. Based on these reports, the RP calculates members reputation, and considers as malicious nodes members having low reputation. Mathy et al. (2004) analysed the negative impact of cheating about the distance metric on the link stress and on the link stretch of the constructed overlay tree. Authors in Li et al. (2005) proved the negative impact of cheating on the stability of the overlay tree topology. Alkubeily et al. (2008) analysed the negative impact of cheating nodes on the performances and on the stability of overlay tree constructed by the protocol MDA-ALM (Alkubeily et al., 2007) . Authors in Jun et al. (2005) proposed a Trust-Aware Multicast (TAM) protocol that computes the level of trust for each node in the overlay tree and adapts the underlying tree according to the trustworthiness of nodes.
ALM key management schemes
Key management problem has been extensively studied for basic IP multicast sessions as in Challal et al. (2004) and Rafaeli and Hutchison (2003) . The main goal of a key management scheme is to reduce the impact of membership changes while ensuring the security requirements during the multicast session. Key management in ALM have received less attention. Authors in Abad et al. (2005) classified key management schemes for Overlay Multicast into three categories: Group Key, Neighbours Key and Clusters Key scheme. In the Group Key Scheme, a unique TEK is shared among all hosts and is used to encrypt and decrypt all the needed traffic. In the Neighbours Key Scheme, each pair of neighbours in the overlay share a specific key, packets are decrypted and re-encrypted at each intermediate host along each path in the tree. In the Clusters Key Scheme, which can be applied in case of hierarchical ALM overlays, a separate key is shared among all members of a given subgroup, encryption and decryption of the traffic is done only at the frontiers between the clusters. Figure 2 gives an overview of these three schemes as well as our TKS scheme. We describe in what follows in more details each of the above schemes. 
GKS: Group Key Scheme
In the Group Key Scheme (GKS) scheme, a unique secret key is shared among all the ALM group members. The group manager (RP: Rendez-vous Point) should update this TEK after each membership change event. During a join process, a new member establishes a secure channel with the RP and asks for a new TEK. The RP triggers the rekeying process, generates a new TEK and sends this new TEK to the new member. The RP may use the old TEK to securely send the new TEK to all other members of the group.
After a leave event, the RP is notified and then it triggers a rekeying process and generates a new TEK that it will send to remaining members through individual secure channels.
Using this scheme, data is encrypted once at the RP and decrypted at end-host members, no intermediate decryption/re-encryption operations are needed.
NKS: Neighbours Key Scheme
On the opposite of the GKS scheme, authors in Liebeherr and Dong (2007) propose to use a different TEK between each pair of neighbours in the overlay tree. During a join process, no rekeying is needed, the new member needs just to establish a separate TEK with its parent and to receive group data through this individual secure channel.
To leave the group, a member should just inform its parent to terminate the shared secure channel. Here also, no rekeying is needed. So, in this scheme no extra operations are required to guarantee backward/forward secrecy.
The disadvantage of the Neighbours Key Scheme (NKS) is that the multicast traffic should decrypted and re-encrypted at each node in the overlay tree. This increases the end-to-end delay which may be critical for multimedia and real time applications.
CKS: Clusters Key Scheme
The Clusters Key Scheme (CKS) (Yiu and Chan, 2004) may be seen as a balance between the two previous schemes. As seen in the above related work section, some ALM protocols use hierarchical clusters to construct the overlay tree. In this case we can use a separate TEK for each cluster.
As a joining/leaving member is assigned in the layer zero of the hierarchical. When a join or leave event occurs within a given cluster, the cluster leader triggers a local TEK rekeying which will affect only members in the concerned cluster. To traverse from one cluster to another, the group traffic should be decrypted and re-encrypted at the clusters boundaries.
This scheme reduces the rekeying overhead and keeps the decryption/re-encryption overhead acceptable.
An overview of our scheme TKS: Transition Key Scheme
In the TKS scheme, we propose to use a unique TEK for the group. This TEK is updated periodically, as in all other schemes, in order to prevent cryptoanalysis attacks. During one TEK period, if a new member joins the group, it will establish a separate secure channel with its parent using an individual TEK, called Transition Key. Using this way, there is no need to update the TEK for other members in the session. This new member will stay in this transition state until the next rekeying period, it will then receive the new group TEK and will no longer use a separate channel.
After a leave event, a TEK renewal is always needed to ensure forward confidentiality.
As it will be shown later, our scheme reduces significantly the overall security overhead.
TKS (Transition Key Scheme): detailed description
Secure multicast session initialisation process
Access control to overlay multicast communications is typically provided by encrypting the data using a key that is shared by all legitimate group members. In the overlay multicast session, the RP plays the role of group key management controller. The RP maintains all the public keys of all legitimate members in the overlay group. In order to initialise the secure multicast session, the RP generates a new TEK and sends it to all members in the group using their public keys as illustrated by the example in Figure 3 . We can write the initialisation process as illustrated in Figure 4 . 
Join process
The new member uses the underline overlay routing protocol to determine the attachment node which it should use as parent to join the overlay tree. The method used to choose the selected parent depends on the type of routing algorithm: Centralised or Distributed.
In the Centralised approach, the new member sends a join request message to the RP which maintains information about the distance between all the group members, and then the RP calculates the best place for this new member and informs it about its place in the overlay. In contrast, in the Distributed approach, the overlay tree is constructed in an incremental manner.
Therefore, the new member calculates its own place using different metrics, and determines its parent in the overlay tree. After the selection of the parent for the new member, the latter establishes a secured channel (e.g., using Diffie-Hellman) with this chosen parent. Figure 5 details steps in the join process between the new member and its parent as follows:
1 The new member sends first a join_request message to the parent.
2 If the latter is available and may accept this request, it responds with a certificate_request message.
3 The new member responds by sending its certificate.
4 The parent authenticates the new member and verifies if it is authorised to access the overlay session. The authorisation may be done through a simple list of authorised members Access Control List (ACL) which is sent by the group manager to all members at the beginning of the session, or through a dedicated AAA server used to manage the current session.
5 In case of successful authentication and authorisation, the parent sends an join_accept message to the new member.
6 The new member may also request the certificate of the parent in order to accomplish the mutual authentication.
7 The parent sends then its certificate.
8 Whence this mutual authentication is realised.
9 The new member and its parent trigger a key agreement process to establish a temporary Transition Key to be used by the parent to encrypt the forwarded data. The process executed following a join event is illustrated in Figure 6 . 
Leave process
We distinguish two cases for leaving members. If the leaving member is still in the transition state and so still using a separate secured channel with its parent, then this member has just to inform its parent using a leave_request message, and to shutdown the secured channel. In this special case we do not need to trigger a complete rekeying process, since the forward and backward secrecies are preserved with current used group TEK.
However if the leaving member uses the current group TEK, and is no longer in the transition state, a complete rekeying process should be done to ensure the backward and forward secrecies in which the RP generates a new TEK and sends it to all members. Each member in the group TEK and in the transition state will receive this new TEK encrypted by its public key. Figure 7 illustrates the leave process in TKS. 
Periodic rekeying process
The group TEK should be periodically renewed. The group manager generates a new TEK and sends it to all members in the group using separate secured channels. For members in the transition state, each one of them will receive this new TEK encrypted by its public key and will no longer use the temporary secured channel with their respective parents. The periodic rekeying process should keep the number of members in the transition state as small as possible, this can be done by reducing the rekeying period.
Figure 8 Leave process steps
However reducing the rekeying period will increases the rekeying overhead. So, we should find the right balance between the rekeying period and the average number of members in the transition state depending on the frequency of membership changes in the session. In the simulation section we will show the best rekeying period for a particular ALM application with specific membership characteristics. We can write the periodic rekeying process as illustrated in Figure 9 . 
Overhead analysis
We analyse the number of cryptographic operations needed in each key management scheme. We first calculate the number of asymmetric operations used for key agreement among the group members and then, we calculate the number of symmetric operations used to encrypt the data traffic. We consider an application level multicast session of duration ∆ with an average number of members equal to N . The application rate is R messages per second. In the case of CKS, C is the average number of clusters and N c is the average number of members per cluster. These notations are summarised in Table 1 . The results of this analysis is summarised in Table 2 . 
TEK management overhead
We measure the overhead in the case of a join and leave events, and in the case of the periodic rekeying process.
Group Key Scheme (GKS)
Join: In order to preserve the backward secrecy, a new TEK should be generated by the RP and sent to all group members through separate secure channels: this needs N times asymmetric encryption and decryption operations.
Leave: In this case a renewal of the TEK is needed to ensure the backward secrecy. So, we need N asymmetric operations.
Periodic rekeying:
When the time to live of the current TEK expires, the RP triggers a TEK renewal and distribution process. This takes also N asymmetric operations.
Clusters Key Scheme (CKS)
Join: For a join event, the same operations as in the previous scheme (GKS) are needed at the cluster level. The overhead is then N c asymmetric operations.
Leave: A leave event needs a local key renewal in the concerned cluster. The overhead is then N c asymmetric operations.
Periodic rekeying: Here a complete key renewal is needed in all clusters. The overhead is then N asymmetric operations.
Neighbours Key Scheme (NKS)
Join: In the NKS, whenever a new member joins the session, a unique secured channel is established between this new member and its parent in the overlay tree. Forward and backward secrecy are ensured without disturbing other members in the group. The overhead is then on 1 asymmetric operation.
Leave: In the same way, the leave of a member does not disturb the rest of members in the overlay, this member simply shuts down the secured channels to its parent and to its children. No further operations are needed. The overhead is then null.
Periodic rekeying:
A general rekeying triggers a complete reestablishment of all secured channels between neighbours. The overhead is then (N − 1) asymmetric operations as there are (N − 1) secured channels.
Transition Key Scheme (TKS)
Join: In the TKS, whenever a new member joins the session, a unique secured channel is established between this new member and its parent in the overlay tree. This transition secured channel will be used until the next general rekeying. The overhead is then on one asymmetric operation.
Leave: In the general case a leave event will triggers a complete rekeying process which takes N asymmetric operations. In some particular cases where the leaving member is still in the transition state, the backward secrecy will be directly ensured without any rekeying, like in the NKS scheme. In this particular case the overhead is null.
Periodic rekeying:
As in all other schemes the general rekeying needs N asymmetric operations.
Data encryption/decryption overhead
In all the schemes, whence the TEK is distributed to each member in the group, the session source can securely send its traffic by encrypting each message using this TEK. Depending on the used scheme, the sent message may undergo several encryption/decryption operations along the path from the source to each member. Hereafter we analyse the number of symmetric encryption/decryption operations needed in each scheme. Note that the source generates (R * ∆) messages during the session.
Group Key Scheme (GKS)
A unique key is used for the whole group, so each message is encrypted once at the source side, and decrypted at the member side. So we need (1 * R * ∆) symmetric operations.
Clusters Key Scheme (CKS)
Here each message is encrypted once at the source, and decrypted/reencrypted by the cluster leader at the boundary of each cluster. So, we need (C * R * ∆) symmetric operations.
Neighbours Key Scheme (NKS)
Members use independent channels to forward the encrypted messages, so each message will be encrypted/decrypted once by each member in the overlay tree. So, we need ((N − 1) * R * ∆) symmetric operations.
Transition Key Scheme (TKS)
In our TKS scheme, each message is encrypted/decrypted once for all members in the group, except for those who are still in the transition state. For those specific members the message is decrypted/rencrypted once again by their parents before it is forwarded through the transition secured channel. If we denote by AN C the Average New Comers for each period during the session (the average number of members in the transition state), then we need ((1 + AN C) * R * ∆) symmetric operations in this case.
Validation
In order to validate TKS, we used the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) validation tool 1 (Avispa. Team, 2006) . AVISPA provides a modular and expressive formal language (HLPSL) (Chevalier et al., 2004) for specifying protocols and their security properties. The HLPSL language allows to easily write security protocols from an Alice & Bob-style specification. AVISPA integrates different validation tools that implement a variety of state-of-the-art automatic analysis techniques.
For the validation we have divided the TKS scheme into four sub-protocols, Initialisation of TEK, Join, Leave and Periodic Rekeying.
Hereafter we give the specification of these four sub-protocols. 2 For each one we precise the involved entities (called roles in HLPSL) and their initial knowledge and we present the message exchange model. Note that the intruder model is internally specified in the AVISPA tool.
Notations used in our specification are summarised in Table 3 .
Initialisation of TEK
This sub-protocol is triggered to initially distribute the T EK to the group members. We have only two roles: the RP and the gm (a group member). All members in the group receive the TEK sent by the RP encrypted by its public key as described in the Figure 10 . Table 4 indicates the initial knowledge of each node in this sub-protocol. 
Join protocol
This sub-protocol is triggered when a node wishes to join the overlay tree. Figure 11 presents messages exchanged between the parent and the joining member gmt. The joining member starts by sending a Join_Request message to its parent with its Public key. The exchanged messages (2 and 3) aim to authenticate the new member and to ensure the protection against the Denial of Service attacks. Finally, the parent sends the TEKT (Transition Key) to the new member, and the latter will stay in this transition state until the next periodic rekeying. Table 5 indicates the initial knowledge of each node in this sub-protocol. 
Leave protocol
This sub-protocol is triggered when a node wishes to leave the overlay tree. Figure 12 presents messages exchanged between the leaving member (gml), the parent, the RP, the normal group member (gm) and the group member in the transition state (gmt).
Figure 12 Leave protocol
The leaving member starts by sending a leaving_Request message to its parent. The parent sends a rekeying_ Request message to the RP which generates a new TEK (TEK') and sends it to all remaining members (gm and gmt). Table 6 gives the initial knowledge of each type of nodes. gml,∀gm,∀gmt,IDRP,IDparent,∀P ub_gml, ∀P ub_gm,∀P ub_gmt,P ub_parent, P ub_i,P ri_i 
Periodic rekeying protocol
This sub-protocol is triggered periodically in order to refresh the TEK. The RP generates a new TEK and sends it to all members (gm and gmt) using individual secured channels. Note that after this rekeying no member will be in the transition state. Figure 13 presents the message exchanged in this sub-protocol. Table 7 illustrates the initial knowledge of nodes. The simulations were carried over a set of random flat graphs generated using a modified version of Waxman algorithm written using NetworkX python library. 4 This technique constructs graphs having similar properties as the internet networks, the links between nodes are added using a probabilistic model. For our simulations we used graphs with 500 nodes and with average degree equal to 4. To generate real multicast sessions, we used models presented in Almeroth and Ammar (1997) . These models suggest that the arrival of members follows a Poisson process and the membership duration is an Exponential distribution. These models are deduced from real multicast sessions observed on the Mbone. In all simulated sessions, we considered a fixed inter-arrival delay of 40 ms, and we varied the membership duration to get the appropriate mean group size (varied from 20 to 300 members).
We considered a multicast application with a 256 packet per second rate, with 1 kb packets. This gives an overall data rate of 256 kb/s. The rekeying period is fixed to 80 s and the number of clusters for the CKS scheme is fixed to 5.
In order to compare the performance of the four rekeying schemes, we measured the overall security overhead. This includes the date encryption/decryption operations overhead as well as the rekeying operations overhead. This overall parameter gives an idea of the efficiency of each scheme in dynamic multicast sessions. Figure 14 gives the overall security overhead for the four schemes GKS, CKS, NKS, and TKS. As expected we notice that our TKS scheme gives the best overhead performances. The NKS scheme gives very bad performances even if it does no rekeying after a join or leave events, this is because data packets need to be decrypted and re-encrypted at each node in the overlay tree. For a 300 members group, our TKS scheme reduces the overall security overhead by 98% compared to NKS, by 87% compared to CKS and by 60% compared to GKS.
Simulation results
The simulation results presented in Figure 14 confirm the overhead analysis presented in Table 2 , Section 4. For instance, if we take the example of a group with average size equal to 300 members and we consider a fixed session with 800 join/leave events. Table 8 gives the simulation parameters considered with this scenario.
For this example, the simulation results for the overall security overhead are 2152 and 7828 for GKS and CKS schemes respectively. The values of this overhead calculated using the overhead analysis are 3344 and 6342 respectively. Figure 15 illustrates the mean security overhead supported by each node in the overlay for the four schemes (GKS, CKS, NKS, and TKS). Figure 16 represents the cumulated overall security overhead for a 300 members group. In Figure 17 , we measure the overall security overhead for our TKS scheme in a 100 members group. We vary the rekeying period from 5 s to 200 s. We notice that for a given group size and a given session characteristics (interarrival rate, application rate, ...), we can estimate an optimal rekeying period that minimises the overall security overhead. In our case the optimal rekeying period is around 60 s. In Figure 18 , we measure the impact of the session dynamism. We consider four types of sessions by varying the membership duration (MMD): highly dynamic session (MMD = 500), very dynamic session (MMD = 2000), dynamic session (MMD = 4000) and low dynamic session (MMD = 6000). We notice as expected that the overall security overhead increases when the session becomes more dynamic. Figure 18 Overall security overhead vs. membership duration for the four schemes and for group size = 50
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented TKS which is an efficient key management scheme for application level multicast. Our scheme uses a unique TEK for the multicast group and a small number of transition keys to individually manage the joining members during a rekeying period. After the renewal of the TEK, these joining members will be fully integrated and will receive the new TEK from their parents. We showed that our scheme reduces significantly the overall security overhead compared to all other schemes. In addition, the validation results shows that our proposition is safe against the intruder attacks.
In a future work, we plan to integrate TKS in some selected ALM protocols and to study implementation details depending on the characteristics of each selected protocols.
